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CASES NOTED
an individual solely because another state agency (state-regulated primary)
exists. If it is in fact an integral part of the state's election machinery, it is
in fact performing a function of the state and should be governed by the
provisions in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION
IMPLIED WAIVER
Appellants, as sureties for fugitives, appealed from a contempt citation
based upon their refusal to answer the court's questions concerning the
whereabouts of the fugitives. Held, that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was impliedly waived by voluntary assumption of the obligations of a
surety. United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 72 Sup.
Ct. 202 (1951).
The privilege against self-incrimination is recognized as a personal right.
It may be waived, but only by the individual concerned.' Wiginore indi-
cates that specific waiver of the privilege may be made by contract or other
binding pledge, and that such waiver becomes irrevocable.2 However, there
seems to be little support for this view:a Several English and American
courts have held such contracts against public policy and deemed the only
valid waiver to be voluntary testimony in open court.
In 1930, New York investigations impelled a movement to require a
specific waiver of the privilege as a prerequisite for holding certain public
offices. The state constitution outlines qualifications for such offices, and
the additional requirement was contested as an abridgement of the privi-
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) ("If a law fair on its face is applied with an evil eye to
make illegal discrimination between persons in circumstances material to their rights, it
is within the prohibition of the constitution"); Perry v. Cyphers, 186 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1951); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947); White v. County Democratic
Executive Committee, 60 F.2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1932); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp.
933 (E.D.S.C. 1948); United States v. Malphurs, 46 F. Supp. 903 (SD. Fla. 1942); James
v. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945) (constitutional provisions
against discrimination because of color evidence a definite national policy); Buttz v.
Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.W.2d 225 (1947); Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb.
212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952); Application of Stillwell Political Club, 109 N.Y.S.2d 331
(1951); see County Democratic Executive Committee v. Booker, 53 S.W.2d 123, 125
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (dissent). But see Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir.
1946).
1. State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944); McConnell v. State,
180 Okla. Crim. Rep. 688, 197 Pac. 521 (1921); Scribner v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. Rep.
465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913); 8 WIlMORE, EVIDENcE § 7a (3d ed. 1940) (waiver of rules
of evidence).
2. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2275 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See Note, Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrirnination by Public Officers,
30 CoL. L. REV. 1160 (1930).
4. State v. Rockola, 339 II1. 474, 171 N.E. 559 (1930) (pre-trial agreement to
testify, though morally binding, cannot subject defendant to contempt proceedings if lie
claims the privilege); In re Sales, 134 Cal. App. 54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933); Lee v. Read,
5 Beav. 381 (18 42). Contra: United States v. Thomas, 42 F. Supp. 722 (D. Del, 1942).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
leges and immunities of citizens.' The problem presented in the instant
case is whether a waiver can be demanded for those public positions not
described by constitution, i.e., a court-appointed suretyi
Wigmore states that an implied contract, inferred from the relation-
ship of the parties, is an effective waiver.7 For example, a fiduciary principal-
agent relationship sometimes requires disclosure of incriminating facts.8
However, the majority of American decisions hold that violation of that
implied duty may subject the agent to punishment, but does not force him
to speak. Police officers and public officials have also been deemed morally
bound to reveal certain self-incriminating information. If claiming the
privilege is inconsistent with their assumed obligations they may forfeit their
positions but remain silent. 10
A waiver is inferred where the power to engage in an activity is a legisla-
tive grant and subject to revocation." Thus, use of the highways requires
compliance with accident report regulations. 2  Persons operating liquor
stores, selling drugs, practicing medicine or directing corporations under
state licenses must reveal records and pertinent information. 3 The legisla-
tures can also require a waiver of the privilege when immunity from crim-
inal prosecution is granted,' 4 provided the immunity afforded is as broad
5. U.S. CONST. Art. XIV, § 1; People v. McCormick, 261 111. 413, 103 N.E. 1053
(1913); People v. Williams, 145 I11. 573, 33 N.E. 849 (1893); Evansville v. State, 118
hId. 426, 21 N.E. 627 (1889); McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 109 (1868); Note, Claim
of Immunity from Self-Incrimination by Public Officers, 64 U.S.L. REv. 561 (1930);
Note, Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination by Public Officers, 30 COL. L.
REV. 1160 (1930).
6. Obviously, the instant court would uphold such a requirement.
7. 8 WcMORE, ETIDE*CE § 2275 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Green v. Weaver, 1 Sim. 404 (1827) (implied relation of fidelity between
broker and agent requires disclosure); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911),
cited with approval in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-590 (1946) and Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (production of certain documents demanded on
grounds that a custodian had voluntarily assumed a duty which overrode his claim of
privilege); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612
(1911) (officers of a corporation "by virtue of the assumption of their duties as such
are bound by the corporate obligation and cannot claim a personal privilege in hostility
to the requirement").
9. Ex parle Berman, 287 Pac. 125 (Cal. App. 1930); Hickman v. London Assur.
Corp., 184 Cal. 524, 195 Pac. 45 (1920); Warren v. Holbrook, 95 Mich. 185, 54 N.W.
712 (1893); Vineland v. Maretti, 93 N.J. Eq. 513, 117 Atl. 483 (Ch. 1922).
10. Christal v. Police Comm'r of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d
416 (1939) (constitutional privilege may be exercised by all persons, including police offi-
cers); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 213 (1936) (option of refusal).
I1. Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912); People v. Rosenheimer,
209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
12. Ibid; Note, 'Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination by Public Offi-
cers, 30 COL. L. REV. 1160 (1930).
13. Ex Parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912); Shapiro v. United
Statcs, 335 U.S. 1 (1947); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Ex parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 38
Pac. 364 (1894).
CASES NOTED
as the waiver required.';-, The courts, alone, possess no power to grant
immunity in order to force discovery.",
The court, in the instant case, based the waiver upOl1 an implied con-
tractual relationship arising between appellants and the court upon the
formwr's assumption of the obligations of sureties. It reasoned that a
surety's duty to the court does not end with forfeiture of the bail fund, but
continues until the defendants arc delivered into the custody of the court.
Upon voluntary assumption of the role, the right to claim any privilege upon
relevant topics is waived. The sureties were therefore held obliged to reveal
knowledge of the fugitives' whereabouts, notwithstanding that "all the prece-
dents say that the ...privilege ...cannot be abolishcd constitutionally by
advance contracts between private persons or even between a government
and its crime-detecting officials."17
Never before have the courts so extended an implied waiver.' 8 Whether
the privilege itself is an archaic result of the rebellion against the tyranny of
the Church and its Oath Ex Officio,'0 or necessary for the preservation of
our American heritage of "political liberty and personal freedom, °"20 the
court in the instant case has, without adequate precedent, carved another
exception out of a privilege already deeply scarred.'
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED
MINOR TO SUE PARENT FOR PERSONAL TORT
Plaintiff, an unemancipated iminor, brought an action by his next friend
against a partnership of which his father was a member for injuries sustained
as a result of defendants' negligence in the maintenance of their property.
Held, that a parent in his business or vocational capacity is not immune
15. See Apodoca v. Viramontcs, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); People v.
Lorch, 171 Misc. 469, 13 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Ct. Gcn. Sess. 1939); People v. Reiss, 8
N.Y.S.2d 209, 20 N.E.2d 8 (1939).
16. Apodoca v. Viramontes, supra note 15.
17. See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion
by Frank, v.). , (t
18. State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944) (waiver of tie privilege
must be intelligent and informed); Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433
(1937) (waiver must be made understandingly and willingly).
19. Seabury, Address, 18 A.B.A.J. 371 (1932) (detrimental to proper administration
of justice); BrNrHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EV1IDENci.E, b. IX, pt. IV, c. III (Bowring's
ed., vol. VII, pp. 452 ff., 1827) (He classifies reasons for the existence of the privilege
into: (1) "old woman's reason" that it's "hard on a man;" (2) "fox hunter's" concept
of fair sport; (3) confounding of interrogation with ancient torture; and (4) association
of the privilege as against unpopular institutions such as the ecclesiastical courts.).
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886). 8 ,VIoCasoE, EVIDENCE §
2251 (3d ed. 1940) (though Wigmore reprints sections of Bentham's amusingly scathing
criticisms, he advocates preservation of the privilege as preventive of the adverse effects
of administrative reliance upon self-accusation and disclosure for conviction). See Inlay,
The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule, 6 MiAmi L.Q. 147, 148 (1952).
21. Query: Would the instant court have held the same way if the fugitives had not
been alleged Communists?
